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A PROGRAM FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE
HARDSHIPS OF LITIGATION DELAYt
RICHARD S. MILLER*
The inability of litigants to obtain swift justice is a searing reproach
to the legal profession. If the public's confidence is to be restored
and preserved, the profession must undertake a comprehensive pro-
gram of reform. The ground work for reform is provided by the
author's thorough analysis of the causes and effects of delay in the
courts and a suggested program of specific reforms which merits
careful consideration by the members of the bar.
Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in
the course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows
what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been
observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five
minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the
premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause;
innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old
people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found
themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without know-
ing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds
with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a
new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled,
has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away
into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers
and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in
and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed
into mere bills of mortality; there are not three Jarndyces left upon
the earth perhaps, since old Tom Jarndyce in despair blew his
brains out at a coffeehouse in Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and
Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the Court, perennially
hopeless ....
Dickens, BLEAic HousE
The problem of litigation delay, as Dickens' quotation attests, has
long been with us. Like the weather it is a common topic of conversa-
tion, at least among judges and lawyers. Unlike the weather someone
occasionally does something about it; Jarndyce and Jarndyce would
probably receive speedier treatment in the reformed English courts
today. Nonetheless, delay in the litigation process still exists and,
where it exists, frequently causes hardship. That litigants are still
suffering hardship from inability to obtain swift justice is a searing
t' The writing of this paper was sponsored by the Ohio Legal Center Institute.
The views expressed herein are the author's; they do not necessarily reflect the opinions
of the Ohio Legal Center Institute.
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
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reproach to the entire legal profession. But worse, the failure to find
enduring solutions to the problems of delay jeopardizes the future
of the judicial institution; public frustration may well lead to the
initiation of alternatives wholly unacceptable to those who venerate
the existing system.
It is the pressing obligation of the bar, therefore, to clean its own
house. In doing so, however, it is not enough to resort to gimmickry
alone. Modernizing calendar control, adding a few judges, tightening
up the granting of continuances, and shifting judges around the state
may well serve as a temporary palliative. But if hardship-causing
delay is to be exorcised from the system on an enduring basis, a much
bolder and more comprehensive program is required; one which will
not only provide short-term solutions but which will bring to light
and cure those defects in the system and in the legal profession which
allow delay-caused hardship to be tolerated.
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest the outlines of such a
program. Before turning to specific recommendations, however, it may
be wise to explore briefly both the effects and causes of delay and
to emphasize that not all delay is harmful. "Justice delayed is justice
denied" has its opposite in "justice rushed is justice crushed."
I. THE EFFECTS oF DELAY
The beneficial effects of delay are seldom given the weight they
deserve. The litigation process, however, does not always yield its
best results under stress of rigid time requirements; experience with
totalitarian regimes suggests that speed ought not to be equated with
justice. Lawyers must be allowed a fair opportunity to prepare their
clients' cases, to investigate facts, to utilize available discovery pro-
cedures, to develop legal issues and to plan their presentations care-
fully. In personal injury cases the passage of time may reveal the true
nature and extent of the injuries more accurately than physicians can
predict by examination shortly after the operative event. The chances
for fair settlement out of court are enhanced when through maturation
the claimant's damages become more certain and less speculative. In
divorce cases delay prior to trial may provide a cooling-off period
which, if properly utilized, can increase the chances of reconciliation.Apart from providing opportunity for preparation, negotiation
and settlement, which in themselves tend to cut down calendar con-
gestion, the absence of time pressure may provide other advantages
to litigants and to the judicial process. In jurisdictions where a rela-
tively small number of well-known, competent attorneys receive a
disproportionate share of the trial work, the liberal granting of con-
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tinuances will provide a litigant who has his heart set upon the
personal services of a particular attorney a better chance of retaining
him to try the case. Where cases come to trial rapidly and where
continuances are not freely allowed, a client may be forced to accept
an attorney who is not his first choice. As for the judicial process it-
self, its machinery does not usually yield the best product when judges
are forced to grind out their work under heavy time pressure. judicial
decision-making is an intellectual process which requires time for
research and reflection. To sacrifice the quality of decision-making for
quantity would most assuredly create widespread dissatisfaction with
the entire process.1
To be sure, there are some kinds of delay which do not yield the
benefits just suggested, and, even where these benefits are present,
it does not follow that the advantages to be derived from some mitiga-
tion of time pressure justify aggravated or unreasonable delay. Such
delay can have as unfortunate an impact on the litigant and on the
system as a draconian law.
The most visible example of hardship occurs in the personal
injury case where plaintiff is not in a position financially to await the
outcome of a long, drawn-out procedure.2 Here delay may force a
settlement on terms unfair to the claimant. The same is true in the
area of workmen's compensation. Likewise, in the probate area, a
delay in settling a decedent's estate may impose undue hardship upon
the survivors. Such delay may not only cause hardship to claimants
who cannot afford to wait it out, but it may also lead to support of
clients by attorneys, in which case the attorney will have a greater
financial interest in the outcome of the action than is proper.3
Of course, delay which adversely affects the economic or social
standards of the claimant also has a long-term detrimental effect on
1 This is particularly true with respect to criminal cases. See the series of articles
in the Washington Post, Feb. 1-12, 1966, criticizing the operations of the General
Sessions Court of Washington, D.C..
2 This paper deals mainly with delay in civil actions, although some of the sug-
gested programs would have a salutary effect on delay in criminal cases. That delay
causes serious hardship in criminal cases, particularly where a defendant must remain
in custody without bail pending trial, has been widely recognized. See "Punishment
Before Trial," 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 6 (1964). Hardship may also occur where certain
crimes are not promptly brought to book, such as housing code violations. As the Build-
ing Commissioner of the City of New York was recently reported to complain, "When
cases involving housing violations are adjourned, the crimes against the tenants con-
tinue." N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1966.
3 See Canon 43, The Canons of Professional Ethics of the ABA.
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the legal system itself. Aggrieved individuals become impatient with
the system and, if they can, resort to other alternatives including, on
occasion, civil disobedience and violent self-help. On a less serious
level, it is no secret that businessmen, refusing to brook the incon-
venience, delay and expense of civil litigation, have increasingly
turned to commercial arbitration as a substitute.4
Delay also adversely affects the quality of judicial fact-finding.
Since the memory of witnesses tends to fade, the attempt in the
trial process to arrive at some approximation of the truth or even to
arrive at the preponderant probabilities becomes more unrealistic as
time passes. It is perhaps a mockery of realism to suggest that the
witnesses to a complicated automobile accident can reconstruct the
operative events with any accuracy when called upon to do so several
years after the occurrence.
In addition, in terms of the objectives of the American legal sys-
tem, delay may tend to erode the controlling effect of judicially applied
rules. In order to be effective the rules by which people guide their
conduct ought to be applied to them reasonably soon after the opera-
tive events take place. If there is a great delay in the litigation process
a lawyer may advise his client that even though his proposed conduct
may violate a law, he will not be held accountable until some years
after the unlawful conduct occurs. In such a case the client is less
likely to be deterred than if the sanction presented an immediate
threat. This problem becomes particularly acute when the economic
gain to be achieved by violating the law until the delayed judgment
is handed down and enforced exceeds the cost of the judgment.
From the foregoing, it would seem to follow that delay has both
beneficial and harmful effects and that devices designed only to elimi-
nate delay, without due regard for the consequences, may be un-
satisfactory. Rather, the primary objective of the bar should be to
eliminate the hardships and ill effects of delay rather than to eliminate
delay per se. In some situations, however, certain ill effects of delay
can only be prevented by eliminating the delay itself.
4 In the personal injury area, proposals have included arbitration, removal of
litigation from the courts to administrative agencies applying scheduled payments sim-
ilar to workmen's compensation, and sophisticated plans for "new allocations of the
burden of motoring injuries." See, e.g., Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the
Traffic Victim-A Blueprint for Reforming Automobile Insurance (1965).
Donald B. Strauss, President of the American Arbitration Association, reported
in a letter to the Editor of the New York Times, February 16, 1966, the growing
use of and satisfaction with arbitration in settling claims of insured motorists arising
out of accidents with uninsured persons.
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II. CAUSES oF DELAY
A. Institutional Factors
1. Insufficient Manpower
One of the most obvious causes of trial delay is an insufficient
number of trial judges. "In the simplest terms, delay is a problem
of supply and demand. If there is delay it must be because the de-
mand for judge time has outrun the supply."5 Increasing the number
of judges will result in cleaner dockets only if judges do not treat the
increase as an excuse for reducing the amount of time they spend in
"judging."
There are some indications that there is an inadequate number
of judges to handle the case loads in the large population centers of
Ohio.6 And even some less sizable counties are having difficulties. For
example, the Ohio Legislature has not added a judge to the civil
branch of the judiciary in Lucas County since 1930. 7 While all cases
ready for trial can be tried in Lucas County in eleven to twelve
months after filing, this generally favorable situation is not expected
to continue without the addition of more new judges and the continued
use of visiting judges.8 In general, however, insufficiency of the num-
ber of judges does not appear to be a serious cause of delay in the
less populous counties; 9 in these areas delay may be attributed to other
factors. 10
Providing more judges for urban counties may be a political
problem exacerbated by rural control of the state legislature. The
problem may be mitigated by reapportionment.
5 Zeisel, Kalvern & Buckholz, Delay in Court 3 (1959).
6 See Institute of judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study-1963, Personal
Injury Cases 5 (1963). The average delay from answer to trial in personal injury cases
in common pleas court in 1963 was 35.7 months in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), 23.2
months in Hamilton County (Cincinnati), 17 months in Franklin County (Columbus),
and 21.4 months in Montgomery County (Dayton). In 1965 the average delay in
Cuyahoga County was 42 months. Id. at 10.
7 This information was contained in a letter from the Hon- Geraldine F. Macel-
wane of the Lucas County Common Pleas Court to the author, Oct. 4, 1965.
8 Annual Report Showing the Progress of Lucas County Common Pleas Court for
1964 at 9.
9 See Institute of Judicial Administration, Calendar Status Study-1963, Personal
Injury Cases ii, 5 (1963) and Institute of judicial Administration, Calendar Status
Study-1965, Personal Injury Cases vii, 10 (1965).
10 For example: "A single lazy judge, who disliked trial work, refused to set cases
for trial and built up a backlog of 500-600 cases, 4-5 years old." 1964 Common Pleas
judges' Meeting 2.
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2. The Darkened Courtroom
Even if in theory there are sufficient judicial resources to prevent
serious backlog, inefficient utilization of time and poor organization
can result in delay. This is largely a problem of calendar control. It
can be argued that when cases are settled during trial, continuances
are granted, or a trial is completed earlier than expected, the emptied
courtroom and the judge's time should be immediately utilized for a
new trial, pretrial, or motion hearings. While there is some logic to
the argument, it should be recognized that the crucial question is
what does the judge do with his time when he is not hearing a case.
If the judge's time outside the courtroom is used for research and
opinion-writing which results in well-reasoned decisions, then his work
may be at least as productive in preventing hardship and dissatisfac-
tion with the judicial system as it would be if he spent all of his
daily working hours hearing trials. Is it preferable to have a judge
utilize his time presiding over jury-tried cases or deciding matters as
to which he is the primary decision-maker? It may well be that a
constant flow of trials and hearings, day in and day out, will result
in either poorly reasoned decisions or a backlog of unresolved cases.
The problem of the "darkened courtroom" requires consideration of
both alternatives.
3. Absence of Judicial Control
To the extent that the judicial system fails to provide time
requirements and limitations upon the performance of certain pro-
cedural requirements, or to the extent to which breach of such
requirements and limitations are not met with sanctions, the attorney
is free to ignore and evade time requirements, or to establish his own.
The absence of such controls may lead to delay in ordinary litigation.
For example, an attorney may be allowed to place a personal injury
case on a "non-triable" docket where it will remain until recovered
by motion at the last possible moment. More serious, perhaps, are
the situations where the parties in interest are not as involved in the
litigation. In the settlement of estates and the filing of accounts in
trust matters, for example, the proceedings are frequently not con-
tested and the beneficiaries are not the initiators of the proceedings.
Consequently, the attorney may be tempted to put off indefinitely the
fulfillment of statutory requirements. 1
11 See article in the Columbus Dispatch, Sept 5, 1965, p. 21a, col. 4, describing
the efforts of the late Probate Judge Joseph J. Van Heyde to clear up 500 estates.
"These delinquent cases," Judge Van Heyde reported, "involve millions of dollars,
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4. Procedural Delay
A formalistic procedural system, administered with little or no
regard for the ends of justice, which it is designed to serve, contains
the seeds of delay and frustration. Rigid requirements of form in the
pleadings, for example, give rise to dilatory motions, such as the
motions to strike and make definite and certain, which may be inter-
posed mainly for the purpose of delay. Conversely, vague and loose
procedural requirements may produce a like effect. The right to
plead in vague terms may cause a lengthy postponement of the time
when the triable issues are recognized and a consequent postponement
of effective settlement negotiations.
Even procedures designed to expedite the just determination of a
case can have a contrary effect. The right to an interlocutory appeal
of a preliminary question, for example, may prevent hardship and
delay in instances where the final resolution of the issue may obviate
the necessity of a plenary trial. But this right can also cause delay
where a party is allowed to appeal from a multitude of procedural
decisions made throughout the course of a law suit. Similarly, the
pretrial conference and pretrial discovery, designed to prevent
surprise, to encourage settlement, and to speed up the trial of a case,
contain the seeds of delay. A meaningless pretrial conference, carried
on only to fulfill a requirement of statute or rule and without the
presence of attorneys authorized to make binding agreements or enter
into stipulations, has no effect other than to delay the trial date and
waste the judge's time. 2 Similarly, the discovery process contains
within itself great potential for delay and harassment. One example
is the use of motions and appeals to raise numerous questions during
the taking of depositions.
Perhaps there are some procedural devices which can only have
the effect of speeding up the administration of justice. In the main,
however, most procedural rules are capable either of speeding up the
resolution of a case or slowing it down. What is crucial is the way
in which the rules are administered and interpreted. Overly tight or
overly loose administration of procedural rules, without reference to
the purpose which they are intended to serve, can cause harassment,
delay, and hardship.
create unnecessary expense, prejudice to property rights and loss of earning power to
widows and other beneficiaries."
12 Clark, "Objective of Pre-Trial Procedure," 16 Ohio St. LJ. 160 (1956); "Sym-
posium-Pre-Trial," 7 W. Res. L. Rev. 367 (1953).
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5. Continuance Practice
The use of continuances is a particular area of procedure which
merits special treatment. Whether liberality in granting continuances
is a cause of undesirable delay depends upon a number of variables,
such as the availability of cases ready to fill the gap left by the con-
tinuance, the purposes for which continuances are granted, and the
general state of the calendar. However, in jurisdictions where the
dockets are lagging, where only a few firms are responsible for a
high percentage of litigation, and where a continued case creates a
darkened courtroom, it is probable that the granting of continuances
contributes to delay. 3 Furthermore, from the point of view of the
individual client, the ease of obtaining continuances may cause the
hearing of his case to be postponed beyond the time which the normal
calendar lag would require.
It should be remembered, however, that reform of the continuance
practice may affect other interests, such as a litigant's desire to select
a particular attorney to try his case and the desire of some firms to
maintain control of a large percentage of the cases tried in a partic-
ular jurisdiction.
6. Availability of Witnesses
In trials which require expert testimony, delay may occur when
the experts are not available. In such cases the attorney has a legiti-
mate ground for an adjournment or continuance, but the result, none-
theless, may be to exacerbate delay.
B. Professional Factors
Except when caused by an insufficient number of judges and
insurmountable defects in procedure, delay and attendant hardship
are the results of situations brought about by the prime actors in the
judicial process, the lawyers and judges themselves. The existing
judicial system, consisting of rules and statutes as well as physical
facilities, is for the most part an empty vessel which is only filled with
life by human beings who have wide discretion in the way that they
act. There is much to be said, therefore, for the proposition that if
bench and bar were really interested in mitigating the hardships and
inconveniences caused by delay, they have it within their power to do
so. There are shining examples of judges who, almost singlehandedly,
have quickly eliminated a log jam of cases or at least have made sub-
13 Cf. More Judges Proposed for Cleveland Congestion, 42 1. Am. Jud. Soc'y 29
(1958).
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stantial reductions in unconscionable delays. 4 The relevant ques-
tion, therefore, should perhaps be framed in this fashion: What factors
cause lawyers and judges to create and tolerate non-beneficial delay?
A partial answer to this question might be found by analyzing
all those complex psychological factors, such as personality, intelli-
gence, interests and motivation, which together determine whether
any professional is going to help solve or aggravate the problems
which exist in his profession. In the case of a judge it may be phrased
in terms of a question of "judicial temperament." In the case of a
lawyer it is popular to refer to "professional responsibility." These
terms obviously involve too many diverse and complicated elements
to be discussed in detail here.15 The usual frailties and strengths of
character and ability found in all men, however, may be manifested
in lawyers and judges by specific traits which affect the problem of
delay. For example, an attorney's insecurity may cause him to hoard
unfinished cases which represent unrealized values; excessive egoism
may result in a coldly "professional" detachment from the felt needs
of the litigants; and neurotic self-doubt may create paralyzing fear of
the process of trial. These characteristics, in turn, will tend to affect
the tactics of the practitioner in dealing with his opponents. Thus, the
use of delay to force an unfavorable settlement upon an impecunious
plaintiff may also serve to cushion the lawyer against his own in-
security, egoism and self-doubts.'
There are, of course, non-personal factors which may be relevant
to this injury. In the cases of judges, a strong chief judge or a su-
perior tribunal with power to exercise superintending control may
encourage, if not require, judges to take an active part in solving the
problems of delay. Where elected judges are on the individual assign-
ment system, political pressures may require them to keep their
dockets at least reasonably current. The availability of law clerks to
assist judges in the performance of their decisional functions may
release them from the more tedious aspects of legal research and thus
provide them with time to take a more active interest in judicial ad-
ministration. Conversely, the absence of these factors may permit or
even compel a judge to ignore the problem of delay.
As for lawyers, a heavy workload of cases and trials, coupled
14 See, e.g., Kaufman, "Decongestion Through Calendar Controls,' Annals 85
(March 1960).
15 See generally Redmount, "Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological As-
pects of Legal Consultation," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 972 (1961).
16 See Kunin, "Court Congestion: Some Unorthodox Hypotheses," 39 Conn. P.J.
546, 547-48 (1965).
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perhaps with an unwillingness to share work with others, is obviously
a factor in the creation of delay. As pointed out earlier, an excess of
work may require a lawyer to seek adjournments and continuances
of some cases in order to meet his obligations to others. Similarly, he
may have to ignore or postpone consideration of the problems of some
of his clients for an unreasonable period of time while working with the
files of others. Such a lawyer is not merely ignoring the problem of
delay; he is creating it as well. Other factors may also be relevant.
For example, attorneys whose compensation is measured on a per diem
basis may have a pecuniary interest in resisting settlement and in
prolonging trial.17 The temptation may be irresistible to a lawyer
whose practice does not yield a reasonably good return and who has
substantial living expenses. And, finally, inefficient and slipshod
office management may also contribute to the overall problem.
C. The Client
There are many situations in which the client himself is a cause of
delay. If he dallies in bringing his problem to a lawyer in the first
place, he may create time-consuming problems of proof-gathering. If
he fails to respond to requests from his own attorney to gather spe-
cified items of evidence, to provide information, to attend conferences,
or to sign documents, he may cause delay which may in turn be a
cause of hardship to co-parties and to his opponents.
Occasionally, clients may make unreasonable demands upon
their lawyers and the judicial system. They may ignore good advice
as to the reasonableness of a settlement and insist, perhaps vindic-
tively, upon their right to a trial.
However, actual delay caused by a client may not be nearly so
serious, from the point of view of the integrity of the judicial system
and the esteem of the legal profession, as imagined delay. A real
delay may not necessarily cause hardship. And even if actual hard-
ship is caused, it need not reflect adversely upon the judicial system
or the legal profession. Some delay and some hardship is bound to
occur in any judicial system. What is meant by imagined delay,
therefore, is really the response of a client who becomes angered and
frustrated by a delay which is not excessive or, even if excessive, is
unavoidable. Studies have shown that a client, to be satisfied, may
need more than a successful outcome from his lawyer. He may re-
quire reassurances, commiseration, and a sense that his attorney and
the judicial system are really interested in his cause.'? A trial delay
17 Similarly, a lawyer whose contingent fee increases after trial is begun may
be encouraged to postpone settlement in order to receive a higher fee.
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of ten months or one year for a personal injury action is certainly
not excessive and may, indeed, be considered ideal. But if the client
is left totally in the dark by his lawyer after the initial conference
and throughout the delay period, and if the nature of the proceedings
and the reasons for the delay are not explained, he may actually
believe that he and his cause have been deserted.
The cumulative effect of such imagined delay is extremely harm-
ful to the public's confidence in the legal system and to the reputation
of the bar. It may, indeed, account for more bitterness than the rela-
tively small amount of genuine hardship caused by actual delay.
III. RECOMMENDED PROGRAMS
The purpose of this section is to set forth a series of programs
which, taken together, would go a long way toward curing the disease
of delay-caused hardship if effectively implemented. It is not the
writer's intention to suggest any necessary priorities among the sug-
gested programs or even to endorse each of the reforms they suggest.
What is recommended, however, is a massive, bar-supported attack
upon delay-caused hardship which would entail careful study of the
programs outlined here, followed by prompt and effective implementa-
tion of those which prove feasible.
A. Institutional Reform
1. Advancement of Cases for Trial
It is recommended that a study be made of court rules and
statutes providing for advancement of cases for immediate trials to
determine the extent to which cases in which delay causes actual
hardship are entitled to and receive priority on trial dockets. 9 The
study should extend to administrative agencies, like the Industrial
Commission,2" as well as to the courts. W"here necessary, new proce-
dures should be developed to insure that cases involving real hardship
and matters vital to the public interest, and only those matters, receive
special treatment. These might include the requirement that the
party seeking the advancement execute an "affidavit of special ur-
gency" containing specified factual information or even the require-
ment that he testify in court as to the reasons for hardship. Penalties
for false swearing more easily applied than conviction for perjury,
18 See Redmount, "Psychological Discontinuities in the Litigation Process," 1959
Duke LJ. 571 (1959).
19 Cf. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2311.07-.08, and § 2501.09 (Page 1954).
20 Cf. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ch. 4123 (Page 1954).
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such as imposition of costs and attorneys' fees, might be adopted.
Proposed statutes might spell out, in some detail, priorities to be
assigned to special classes of cases, or, if more flexibility were desired,
the assignment of priorities might be administered pursuant to binding
court rules promulgated by a judicial body. A carefully planned and
studiously supervised advancement program, as described above,
should provide an effective short-term solution to the problem of
hardship caused by actual delay.
2. State-Wide Court Reorganization
It is recommended that strategies be formulated to effectuate a
program, heretofore unsuccessful, to reorganize the Ohio judicial sys-
tem.2' The establishment of a simplified court structure and the
creation of clear lines of judicial responsibiltiy should result in
more efficient operations. Current proposals call for the partial unifica-
tion of the courts, the placing of broad rule-making powers in the
Supreme Court of Ohio, and the adoption of a modernized plan for
the selection and retention of judges, all of which are to be ac-
complished initially through constitutional amendment.2 Reforms
of this scope frequently run head-on into vested interests or, worse,
into the inertial biases of influential persons perfectly satisfied to
retain a system which is at least familiar to them, even if it has few
other redeeming features.23 Strategy planning here should obviously
attempt to secure the broadest possible support from influential mem-
bers of the legal community and the public-at-large and should in-
clude, as well, a program of public education.2
3. Extended Court Sessions
The possibility of scheduling trials in the evening, as an expedient
to clean up a jammed docket, ought to be examined. There would
appear to be a number of advantages to this practice, perhaps the
most important being the greater availability of parties and witnesses.
In addition, jurors could be selected from a wider and more repre-
sentative cross-section of the population if the excuse of work hard-
ship were not available.
21 See Morris, "What Court Reform Can Do for You," 21 Columbus Bar Briefs,
No. 11, p. 4 (Feb. 4, 1966).
22 The proposals are spelled out in 37 Ohio St. BA. Report 371, 1249 (1964)
and discussed therein at 916, 955, 987, 1008 and 1036.
23 See generally Nims, "The Law's Delay: The Bar's Most Urgent Problem," 44
A.BAJ. 27 (1953).
24 Ibid.
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Similarly, the utilization of summer months for jury trials ought
to be explored.25
4. Impartial Witnesses
Several jurisdictions have resorted to a panel of "impartial"
medical witnesses as a device to reduce the time consumed by expert
medical testimony. Such a device also discourages purely frivolous ac-
tions, encourages settlement, and assists the trier of facts where the
experts provided by the parties are in irreconcilable conflict. The
feasibility of the use of such panels, especially in counties where delay
is a serious problem, ought to be explored. However, a caveat is in
order: The use of "impartial" medical witnesses may be inconsistent
with the tenets of the adversary system. Its use, therefore, ought not
lightly to be undertaken.26 If undertaken, it ought to be accompanied
by substantial safeguards to insure that the panel does not become a
partisan proponent of one point of view.
5. Pre-Judicial Tribunals
Much has been written about the use of informal arbitration
panels and non-judicial hearing officers as a means of clearing up a
backlog of personal injury cases. 21 The success of such innovations
as the Pennsylvania arbitration tribunal and the Massachusetts
"auditor" system,2 however, has not been clearly established. Serious
doubts have been raised as to their efficacy,29 especially in cases where
the financial stakes are high. Nonetheless, carefully developed varia-
tions upon these alternatives might prove useful to clear up a serious
congestion problem.30 They merit careful consideration.
6. Continuance Practice
New Jersey, under the forceful guidance of late Chief Justice
Vanderbilt,31 provided an excellent example of the effectiveness of
25 See Tauro, "Congestion in the Courts," 49 Mass. L.Q. 171, 172-73 (1964).
26 See Report of 1963 Comm. on Expert Testimony of Judicial Admin. Sec., ABA;
Diamond, "The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert," 3 Archives of Crim. Psychodynamics
221 (1959); Report of the Special Committee Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, Impartial Medical Testimony (1956).
27 See, e.g., Dworkin, "Let's Arbitrate," 25 Cleveland BAJ. 107 (1954).
28 See Penna. Stats., tit. 5 § 30 (Purdon 1963); id. tit. 12, Rules of Civ. Proc.
1044(d) (Purdon Supp. 1965); Rosenberg & Chanin, "Auditors in Massachusetts as
Antidotes for Delayed Civil Courts," 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 27 (1961).
29 See, e.g., Tauro supra note 25, at 173, where Chief Judge Tauro, of the
Massachusetts 'Superior Court, reports with pleasure that references of tort cases to
auditors is declining and sets forth some of the objections to the use of auditors.
30 See Strauss letter, supra note 4.
81 As to Justice Vanderbilt's contribution to judicial reform in New Jersey, see
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close control over the granting of continuances as a means of elim-
inating calendar congestion.32 The success in New Jersey suggests
that some tightening of continuance practice,33 perhaps by removing
it from the discretion of the attorneys who may agree as a matter
of course to continuances in order to receive reciprocal treatment,
ought to be considered. The possibilities are not limited to judicial
control by enforcement of inflexible court rules; salutary results might
be achieved as well by requiring the parties themselves to agree in
writing to continuances requested by their own attorneys.
7. Procedural Reform
As suggested earlier,14 procedural rules have their impact upon
court delay,35 especially if they are enforced too strictly or too loosely
without regard to the ends of justice they are designed to serve. If
rules emanate, in a disorganized way, from a variety of different
courts as well as the legislature, they are more likely to be misunder-
stood and miscontrued. Perhaps in the future, the reorganization of
the judiciary into a unified court system with overall rule making
power in the Ohio Supreme Court will provide the necessary pre-
condition for procedural reform. In the meantime, the following rec-
ommendations ought to be considered:
(a) Pleading rules ought to be reexamined and, if necessary,
liberalized to avoid purely technical objections to form.
(b) Rules relating to jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, venue, forum non conveniens, joinder of parties and joinder
of actions ought to be examined carefully to determine the extent to
which their lack of clarity creates delay.36 Perhaps poor statutory
draftsmanship and vague constitutional standards require courts to
spend an unreasonable amount of time on preliminary motions to
dismiss or transfer, or on appeals from the determination of such
motions. It must be recognized that in these areas considerations of
generally, 'Vanderbilt: Administrator of Justice," 31 State Government 224 (1958) in
Elliott, Improving our Courts (1959).
32 See Brennan, "New Jersey Tackles Court Congestion," 40 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y
45, 48 (1956).
33 Ci. Comment, "The Matter of Continuances," 18 Ohio St. L.J. 106 (1957). See
also Rule 15(f) of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court and 42 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 29 (1958).
34 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
35 See Peck, "The Complement of Court and Counsel," The Thirteenth Annual
Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, delivered before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of New York on April 22, 1954.
36 Cf. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ch. 2309 (Page 1954).
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fairness and convenience frequently compete with certainty and
simplicity; the United States Supreme Court's treatment of personal
jurisdiction is a prime example. Nonetheless, even within the frame-
work of vague constitutional standards it may be possible to phrase
statutory requirements to provide for more certainty. Where this is
not possible, lawyers should urge the supreme court to adopt standards
which will accommodate the competing policies.
(c) Pretrial conference practice ought to be carefully exam-
ined. 7 Pretrials can be very helpful in achieving settlement and
shortening trial time, but they can also be wasteful and oppressive
if not properly administered. Court rules should spell out in some
detail the requirements of the pretrial conferences,s making manda-
tory the attendance of attorneys with authority to enter into stipula-
tions, but also making clear that the judge's role is non-coercive.
(d) Rules and statutes controlling appellate practice, and the
practice itself, should be examined to determine whether opportuni-
ties for dilatory tactics are available, particularly in appeals from
non-final judgments or ordersY
(e) Penalties for frivolous motions and dilatory tactics, per-
haps by imposition of attorney's fees and costs, should be spelled out
in court rules and, where necessary, by statute. Such rules should be
invoked either by the parties on motion or by the judge, sua sponte,
where the attorneys are unwilling, perhaps by reason of reciprocity,
to invoke them.
(f) Rules and statutes relating to pretrial discovery ought to
be reexamined with a view to reform designed to take maximum ad-
vantage of the benefits which can be derived from full disclosure of
facts prior to trial.4" Such disclosure, of course, will tend to make the
37 That is, the practice itself rather than merely the appropriate court rules. Ex-
perience indicates that local practices within the same state may vary widely even
under the same court rule. See note 13 supra.
38 See, e.g., Franklin County Common Pleas Court Rule XXVII as amended
February 1, 1965 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
39 Generally appeals in Ohio must be from "final" judgments or orders. 2 Ohio
Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 26 (1953). Nonetheless a variety of techniques may be
available to bring questions to an appellate court during a pending litigation and before
judgment dispositive of all the issues is rendered. In some jurisdictions, for example, a
litigant may delay the proceedings in the trial court by seeking "leave to appeal" from
orders with which he is aggrieved, or he may avoid the finality requirement by seeking
an appeal formally designated as an original writ of mandamus or prohibition against
the trial judge. It is practices such as these and their effects which the recommended
study should attempt to uncover.
40 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. chs. 2317, 2319 (Page 1954) and Ohio Legal Center
Institute, Personal Injury Litigation in Ohio, ch. 20 (1965).
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pretrial conference more effective, shorten trial time and, most im-
portantly, lead to more realistic settlement positions.41 On the other
hand, discovery can be a device for harassment and delay if not prop-
erly controlled. The federal discovery rules, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37,
stand as the model of good discovery practice, combining liberality
with protection against harassment. Perhaps they should serve as the
standard when the local rules are reexamined and reorganized.
8. Split Trials
A recent innovation in procedure which has been received en-
thusiastically by those interested in eliminating calendar congestion
is the use of the split trial in personal injury actions.42 Under this
device the question of liability, if separable from the question of
damages, is tried first. A second trial on the questions of damages is
then held, preferably with the same jury, if, but only if, the defendant
is found liable in the first trial. Since the difficulty of securing the
attendance of medical witnesses is likely to require the granting of
continuances, and since medical testimony is frequently the most
time-consuming element of a personal injury action, the splitting of
trials into two parts has the advantage of avoiding extensive medical
testimony where the liability trial results in a decision for defend-
ant. It must be conceded, however, that the use of the split
trial is controversial and may be disfavored by some, although the
opposition seems to disappear as experience develops. In general, it
is open to the following objections:
(a) It may violate the constitutional rights to jury trial. Al-
though the United States Supreme Court has not passed on the ques-
tion whether its use in a diversity case violates the Constitution, it
would not appear to be a serious problem at least in cases where the
same jury is used for both phases of trial.43
(b) It is not always possible to separate the issue of liability
from the issue of damages.
(c) The split trial may favor defendants by allowing the de-
fendant's attorney to keep plaintiff's serious injuries out of the jury's
view during the trial of liability and thus avoid the emotional impact
41 Tauro, "Improving the Quality of justice in Massachusetts," 49 Mass. L.Q. 7,
14-35 (1964).
42 Meirer, "Court Congestion: A New Approach," 45 A.BAJ. 1265, 1268 (1959);
"Will Split Trials Solve Court Delay? Negative Response," 52 Ill. BJ. 1004 (1964);
Note, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 1059 (1962); see also Note, 17 Okla. L. Rev. 114 (1964).
43 See Hosie v. Chicago & N.Y. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961).
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and sympathetic reaction which may attend the knowledge of such
injuries."
Nonetheless, the split trial ought to be carefully considered. As
Professor Zeisel has stated in his conclusion from a statistical study
of this device: "From our investigation we have learned that separa-
tion is a powerful remedy for court congestion. Fully used, it would be
equivalent to increasing the number of judges trying cases by one-
fifth.",45
9. Elimination or Modification of Jury Trial in Certain Classes
of Cases
If England can be cited as an example, the elimination or modi-
fication of the right to full jury trial in civil actions in a common law
system does not seriously undermine the sanctity of the adversary
system nor does it create serious popular dissatisfaction with the judi-
cial process.46 Since there exists a causal relationship between exercise
of the right to jury trial in civil actions and court congestion, it would
seem to follow that modification of the former might have a salutary
effect upon the latter. However, the right to jury trial, for reasons that
are obvious to most lawyers, is not easily dislodged. Its outright
abolition, or its replacement, in the case of personal injury actions,
with a workmen's compensation-like board or similar substitute, may
be impractical at the present time. Nonetheless, middle grounds ought
to be explored. The use of an auditor or arbitration panel, whose de-
cision may be treated as prima facie evidence in a subsequent trial, if
44 Apparently claimant's counsel, originally distressed with the split trial, have
become more favorably disposed to it, since they may gain an advantage by avoiding
a compromise verdict once liability is established. See address by Hon. Bernard M.
Decker, Judge of the Circuit Court of Illinois before the National Conference of State
Trial Judges in San Francisco, 1962 entitled: "Personal Injury Actions--Separate Trials
on the Issues of Liability and Damages."
45 Zeisel and Callahan, "Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis," 76
Harv. L. Rev. 1606, 1624 (1963).
40 Diamond, "English Interlocutory and Pretrial Practice and Procedure," 47
A.B.AJ. 696, 100 (1961):
[In the last century, the extent of trial by jury in civil actions has steadily
diminished, and now the number of such actions is only about 3 per cent of the
actions in the Queen's Bench Division. There is a legal right to a jury in
actions for libel and slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, seduc-
tion and breach of promise of marriage and a party charged with fraud may
also demand a jury. In all other cases, it is a matter of the court's discretion
whether a jury is awarded or not, but the profession and the public prefer
the greater certainty of trial by judge alone, and a jury is not commonly
asked for.
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one is demanded, has already been suggested.4 7 Other measures might
include (a) increasing the fee for a jury trial; (b) imposition of full
costs of jury trial upon the party requesting it, with only partial
return from the other party in the event of a successful outcome; (c)
abolition of jury trials in certain limited classes of cases where the
need for a community judgment is slight, for example, commercial
actions, cases involving less that a stipulated sum, etc.; or, (d) any
combination of the foregoing.
Other innovations which might tend to cut down the number of
requests for jury trials also deserve some consideration. These differ
from the foregoing in that they would achieve the result by imposing
some limitations upon the amount of recovery, especially for pain and
suffering. Perhaps the initial opposition to proposals limiting the
amount of recovery might be overcome by allowing recovery in a
wider variety of situations, for example, by adopting rules of com-
parative negligence.
10. Calendar Reform
It is recommended that the method of bringing cases to trial be
reexamined for the purposes of instituting reforms designed to pro-
vide a steady, but not oppressive, flow of cases ready for trial. Among
the elements to be studied are the methods by which cases are called
for trial, the assignment system, and the disposition of cases not
ready for trial. Since it has been found that a large proportion of the
cases which cause a backlog are those which will eventually be set-
tled," research should be directed to the formulation of procedures
which will encourage trial judges to maintain contact, personally or
through their clerks, with attorneys handling such cases. Startling
results in jurisdictions with extraordinary problems of congestion
have been achieved by judges who have taken a personal interest in
delayed cases."0
11. Interest on Judgments
Statutes, court rules and decisions relating to interest upon
judgments should be examined and analyzed to determine whether
and to what extent financial advantages may accrue to defendants,
particularly insurers, who delay settlement; whether such advantages,
if they exist, are realized at the expense of claimants and, if so,
47 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
4S See Keeton and O'Connell, op. cit. supra note 4.
49 Geller, "Unreasonable Refusal to Settle and Calendar Congestions-Suggested
Remedy," 34 N.Y.S.1.J. 477 (1962).
GO See Kaufman, note 14 supra.
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whether amendment of interest rules, by increasing the interest rate
and/or by starting interest at an earlier date, might not take some of
the advantage out of delay.5'
B. The Bar
1. Communication with Clients
In order to solve the psychological problem of imagined delay,
attorneys must be encouraged or even required to keep clients in-
formed of the status of their causes and, more importantly, of settle-
ment offers, by regular and frequent communications. If clients have
questions about their cases, whether foolish or not, they should have
reasonable access to their attorneys, and their attorneys should at-
tempt to provide candid and truthful answers. So important is the
need for communications between lawyer and client that it may be
worthwhile to consider the adoption of a new canon of ethics ex-
plicitly requiring such communications.
2. Education of Litigants
In connection with the prior recommendation, it is suggested
that litigants be apprised of the outline of the procedure which their
attorney is following and an explanation, in terms comprehensible to
laymen, of the reasons why their cause may not be promptly re-
solved. To this end it is recommended that the bar prepare a series
of handbooks for parties to civil actions, to criminal actions, to ad-
ministrative proceedings (especially workmen's compensation), to
probate proceedings, to appellate proceedings and perhaps even to
real estate transactions, which would be distributed free of charge to
the parties at their first interview with the lawyer, or perhaps even
before in the case of criminal proceedings." -
3. Law Office Management
It is believed that lawyers, as a group, are notoriously inefficient
in the management of their offices. Yet, a poorly ordered law office
may contribute substantially to delay causing calendar congestion and
hardship to clients. Programs, including conferences, and brochures
designed to introduce lawyers to up-to-date, efficient methods of law
5- See letter of Samuel B. Waterman to the Editor of the New York Times, Feb.
22, 1966, p. 22, col. 7, "Some [insurance] companies . . . prefer the congestion be-
cause they utilize the reserves set aside to further their financial aims." See also Kunin,
"Court Congestion: Some Unorthodox Hypotheses," 30 Conn. B.J. 546, 549 (1965).
52 Cf. the "Juror's Handbook" prepared for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
under the direction of Chief justice G. Joseph Tauro of the Massachusetts Superior
Court.
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office management, especially recent developments in the use of office
equipment, might prove useful here.
4. Policing of Mandatory Time Requirements
There are many techniques available to insure that attorneys
comply with time requirements established by court rule or statute.
Techniques should be adopted which would impose a sanction upon the
attorney, but which would not penalize the client for the attorney's
failure. Thus, for example, the entering of a default judgment or a
non-suit as a penalty for non-appearance at pretrial or for failure
to file a pleading tends to penalize the innocent client more than
his lawyer; an action against the attorney for malpractice is not
a particularly effective sanction. Other techniques, therefore, would
seem to be more appropriate and worthy of study:
(a) Direct Communication Between Tribunal and Client.
Where lawyers are prone to procrastinate in the filing of required
documents, such as the accounts of executors and trustees, it may
prove effective for the judge to send a warning card directly to the
client or, in the case of an estate, to the beneficiaries. Such a practice
might encourage the attorney to avoid the embarassment of explain-
ing his tardiness. Perhaps a standardized procedure requiring such
direct communication in all cases where knowledge of delay is im-
portant to the parties should be adopted by court rule or statute.53
(b) Attorney Fines and Penalties. While controversial, fines
and penalties imposed directly against attorneys who fail to comply
with specific rules might reduce delay more effectively than mere ex-
posure of tardiness to the client.54 If diligently enforced by judges,
this device might be effective not only to penalize failure to meet time
requirements but also to penalize other acts or omissions which tend
to cause delay. For example, the attendance at a pretrial conference
by a junior clerk without authority to enter into stipulations or ne-
gotiate settlement might well justify imposition of a penalty against
the clerk's firm. Perhaps the penalty could be measured by the value
of the lost time of the opposing attorney who attended the conference
for naught, and paid to that attorney. Penalties could also be imposed
53 Mr. justice Black, dissenting in Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962),
argued in favor of "the rule that no client is ever to be penalized . . . because
of the conduct of his lawyer unless notice is given to the client himself that such a
threat hangs over his head." Id. at 648.
54 See generally Comment, "An Attorney Fine: A Sanction to Ensure Compliance
With Court Calendar Orders," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 382 (1963). See also order of
Probate Judge Joseph J. Van Heyde, 20 Columbus Bar Brief No. 17, p. 9 (May 8,
1965).
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for filing frivolous pleadings or motions. The imposition of a monetary
fine might be easier to administer, and far less cumbersome, than
official disciplinary proceedings or exercise of traditional contempt
powers. However, one of the difficulties which must be met in framing
an appropriate statute or court rule would be the likelihood that the
attorney assessed with such a fine might try to charge it back to his
client.
5. Access of Litigants to a Grievance Committee
A grievance committee composed of distinguished lawyers to hear
citizen complaints against lawyers is an appropriate intra-professional
device that has already been shown to work well." Perhaps concilia-
tion committees should also be organized on a local level to hear
complaints before they develop into full-blown "grievances." Wide
publicity could be given to the existence of such committees. Mem-
bers should be encouraged to adopt and apply the highest standards
of the profession in framing their recommendations for further action,
lest their proceedings be characterized as a "whitewash."
6. Improving Professional Responsibility
While specific rules and practices imposed by judicial or legisla-
tive fiat may be effective in the short run to police the problem of
delay and to eliminate the hardships it causes, the bar, as a profession,
has an interest in maintaining order in its own house without external
compulsion. Among the steps which might be taken to elevate the
professional responsibility of the bar and to insure that individual
members concern themselves with the problem of delay are:
(a) Pre- and Post-Graduate Education for Professional Respon-
sibility. Hardship caused by delay is unfair and unjust. Thus this
statement by Professor Harry Jones of the Columbia Law School has
some relevance: "A lawyer, a real lawyer, should react to unfairness,
inequality or abusive procedure as a bishop reacts to heresy or a
painter to a meretricious composition."" Far too many practicing
lawyers, however, conceive of the practice of law as just another
business, another way to earn a living. From this it follows that
ordinary business ethics become the norm of practice. It seems clear
that the law schools and the bar have not done nearly enough to bring
home to lawyers the obligations they owe to their clients and the
public to insure that the judicial system functions fairly and -without
undue delay, an obligation that overrides their personal quest for
5 See 38 Ohio Bar No. 50 p. 1366 (Dec. 27, 1965).
56 Proceedings, Ass'n of American Law Schools, Part Two 77 (1963).
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economic gain. It is suggested, therefore, that both the organized bar
and the law schools develop interesting programs to develop profes-
sional responsibility in lawyers. In this connection it may be suggested
that bringing home to lawyers some of the harsh alternatives that
face them if they abjure their responsibility, a few of which are
outlined in this paper, may be an appropriate technique. Preferably,
however, programs which help to create an understanding of the joys
of professionalism for its own sake, perhaps through study of the lives
of the great lawyers and judges of the past, will tend to inculcate a
more lasting sense of professional responsibility.
(b) Effective Organization of the Bar. A well-organized, effec-
tive bar association can accomplish much by way of reform, especially
if its committees can draw on talent from a wide geographical area.
Decentralization may not be the most effective form of organization.
A comparative study of bar associations might turn up some useful
recommendations for reorganization of the bar.
(c) Admission to the Bar. In the last analysis, the response of
the bar to problems of delay will depend upon the attitudes, efficiency
and ability of the members of which it is composed. The disinterested
lawyer, the inefficient lawyer and the poorly trained lawyer un-
doubtedly contribute heavily, either as practitioners or judges, to the
causes of delay and the hardship it brings to litigants. Perhaps, there-
fore, it is incumbent upon the law schools and the bar examiners to
work together to raise the standards of those who enter the profes-
sion. It is far from clear that these institutions are doing all that can
be done within the framework of the current on-rush of students to
see that standards are improved.
Among the areas which could use some study are admission
standards, including grade averages, test scores and course content,
standards for retention in law school, and particularly, bar examina-
tions. With respect to the last item, inquiries might fruitfully be made
to determine the extent to which subjects covered by the bar examina-
tion reflect an incorrect or obsolete view of the areas of knowledge
vital to the lawyer who functions in today's complex society and the
extent to which such subjects influence course availability and elec-
tion by law students. It might well be discovered that the tail is here
wagging the dog. Further examination of bar examination require-
ments might attempt to detect whether mechanical rule memorization
and arid logic chopping is encouraged, or whether questions asked
call, in addition, for understanding of various legal processes and
theories. Bar examinations which encourage the student to adopt a
mechanistic or purely technical view of the law may, in states where
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such is the case, be more than a slight cause of the non-professional
outlook of many of its lawyers.
Such studies might result in recommendations for greater co-
operation between law schools and bar examiners, for minimum
standards of acceptance and retention in law schools, and, possibly,
for innovations in the process of examination as it is now conceived.
They might even lead to further studies of law student motivation,
including the question whether competition for grades and high scores
on examinations, and the use of such criteria in granting awards and
making job offers, do not tend to distort the values of the student.
C. The Bench
Eugene V. Rostow, former Dean of the Yale Law School, has
written:
The test of court reform is not clearing calendar congestion nor
shortening the time span between the filing of complaints and the
payment of judgments. These dramatic features of the tables of
judicial statistics, about which so many hands are wrung so hard,
are not trivial matters, and many vascular systems have been
strained by devoted efforts to deal with them. But what really
counts is the judges. Have all the pushing and pulling; all the
speeches and letters and articles; all the footnotes and buttonhol-
ings in corridors; all the weary days and nights in committee rooms
and on the telephone, actually resulted in raising the level of judg-
ing? If, but only if we can honestly answer this question in the
affirmative, will the victory be worth the struggle required to winit.57
Conversely, it might be added, elimination of delay and conges-
tion by lowering the level of judging would be far too great a price
to pay. There are, however, some steps which, if prudently taken,
ought to avoid that unfortunate result.5
1. Increase the Number of judges in Counties Where
Calendar Congestion Is a Problem
This, of course, is more easily said than done, political realities
being what they are. Nonetheless, it is the most direct way of pro-
viding additional "judging hours." Perhaps well-organized, non-
partisan public education, as suggested in the next section of this
paper, would eventually create the necessary public support to achieve
57 Rostow, Book Review, 37 Conn. Bar 1. 482 (1963).
8 Needless to say, one way to improve the level of judging is to appoint better
judges. Attempts are already underway in Ohio to improve the judicial selection pro-
cess. See note 22 supra.
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success in the legislature.69 Before inaugurating a campaign for more
judges, careful studies should be made to document the need.
2. Provide Law Clerks to Judges at all Levels
The presence of a law clerk assisting with research ought to
relieve the judge from some of his burden, and thus allow him to
spend more time on tasks that will eliminate congestion and improve
the quality of his judging. Research here might produce proposed
legislation necessary to provide qualified clerks for judges at all levels.
3. Impose Time Limitations and Sanctions
It may be possible to promulgate statutes which limit the time
within which judges can file decisions, hand down rulings on mo-
tions, and perform other judicial functions with suitable accommoda-
tions, of course, for unusual situations. The difficulty with such
statutes is in their enforcement. It is unlikely that a litigant would
care to prejudice his case by bringing an action, such as mandamus,
against a judge to enforce them. But a powerful chief judge or a
superior court with superintending control could be granted power
to employ sanctions against judges to insure compliance with the
statutes.
4. Readjustment of the Judicial Assignment System
Research into the method of assigning cases to judges might
profitably be undertaken. The purpose of such research should be to
achieve an accommodation among the various assignment methods
which most efficiently utilizes judicial resources." To this end it is
suggested that the individual assignment system be given special
attention. There, the assignment commissioner assigns each new
case for all purposes to a single, named judge as soon as the petition
is filed. If properly administered, this system will tend to avoid the
darkened courtroom, to distribute cases requiring special expertise to
the judges possessing special knowledge, to cut down delay caused
when different judges have to familiarize themselves with a complex
case for the purposes of handling different phases of the same case,
to allow related litigation to be assigned to a single judge who will
tend to develop a feel for the entire subject matter, to prevent lawyers
from picking and choosing favorite judges, and to focus light, where
59 Cf. Nims, "New York's 100 Years Struggle for Better Civil Justice," 25 N.Y.S.
B. Bull. 83 (1953).
00 See 1964 Common Pleas Judges' Meeting 9.
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warranted, upon judges who are not carrying their fair share of the
judicial workload.
There are, of course, some disadvantages of the individual as-
signment system which ought not to be overlooked. It may not be fair,
for example, to measure the effectiveness of a judge in an elected
system by his score of cases disposed of; through no fault of his
own he may be assigned a long, complicated case. Furthermore, it
would be doing a disservice to the law if fear of a bad score encour-
aged judges to give inadequate consideration to decisions, or to coerce
settlement. The avoidance of such disadvantages, perhaps by modify-
ing the individual assignment system by bringing in elements of the
"master control" system, or by introducing entirely novel procedures,
ought also to be a major aim of research in this area.
5. Special Education for Judges
Educational programs which deal with problems of judicial ad-
ministration are now available. 1 Perhaps the bar could sponsor travel
by local judges to such meetings or, preferably, sponsor legislation
which would provide state funds for that purpose. If most local
trial judges are unable to attend existing programs, the bar might
support classes, seminars and conferences manned by experts on the
problems of judicial administration and conducted throughout the
state. Such programs should be designed to supplement, but not to
replace, judicial conferences conducted by the judges, themselves,
through their own associations and judicial conferences. If, as is
suspected, the judges now attending such conferences are those who
are already interested and active in solving problems of judicial ad-
ministration, methods should be devised to attract the others into the
educational process.
D. The Public
Most of the problems of nonbeneficial delay could be solved if
those in the legal profession who are concerned about them could
draw upon support for needed reforms from the general public. It
has even been suggested that improvement can only come when non-
lawyers organize themselves to take up the cudgel of reform." In any
event, legislative and, where necessary, constitutional reform can
only be accomplished with public support. Such support, in turn,
cannot be expected in the absence of effective public education. The
61 Institute of Judicial Administration, Judicial Education in the United States, A
Survey 78 (1965).
62 See Nims, note 59 supra.
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public is not likely to put its weight behind legislation calling for ad-
ditional judgeships unless it understands that a pressing need exists.
Unfortunately, the legal profession has not had the best public
relations in the past. Coming but once a year, Law Day cannot be
expected to educate the people to the operation of the judiciary or
create understanding for the problems of the legal profession. What is
recommended, therefore, is the adoption of a program to inform the
public of the role, functions and operations of the legal process. Such
a program should not be directed specifically to the problem of delay,
nor should it be conducted at the level of propaganda. Respect for
the legal profession cannot be created by slogans, shibboleths, or
breezy generalizations. The program should not conceal the problems
that exist in judicial administration. Instead, it should attempt to
educate the public, using that term in its most salutary sense. Every
available means of public communication should be used: the press,
radio, television, seminars, public lectures. Particularly, the bar should
attempt to reach the youth of the community through the public
schools.
The ultimate purpose of such a program, it is suggested, would be
to revitalize the democratic process. If members oi the public are
knowledgeable about an institution of vital importance to society they
will develop a critical ability-a sense of taste-which will enable
them to decide intelligently for themselves which facets of the insti-
tution should be praised and venerated, and which should arouse their
opprobrium and reforming zeal.
More specifically, the kind of program envisioned might include:
(1) Realistic dramatizations, in the public media, of the opera-
tions of the judicial process.
(2) Accurate, well-written newspaper accounts of trials.
(3) Explications, in the various media, of important appellate
decisions in interesting, narrative form.
(4) Introduction of study of the judicial process into the cur-
ricula of elementary and secondary schools.
(5) Lectures by lawyers, judges and law professors, carefully
selected for the depth of their perception, to public and private groups,
and particularly to youth groups. The availability of such lectures
could be publicized through state and local speakers' bureaus.
(6) Public debates about the effectiveness and efficiency of
legal institutions.
(7) Pressure by the organized bar on public media to report
fully, fairly and accurately and, if possible, nonsensationally, on
vital matters relating to legal institutions. This would include bar-
supported condemnation of false and misleading reporting.
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CONCLUSION
The list of recommendations advanced here is not intended to be
exhaustive. There are other programs which might prove equally as
fruitful as those which have been included. Examples include studies
of the Ohio lawyer, litigant and judge, which might yield illuminating
data on how or why these persons create or tolerate delay; or research
into the use of electronic devices which might result in recommenda-
tions to enhance the efficiency of courts. Examination of the causes
of delay, as set forth in part II of this paper, will also suggest other
fruitful inquiries. It is only to keep within manageable proportions that
the programs set forth here have been rather arbitrarily limited to
inquiries which can lead to effective reform within a reasonable time
and to problems which cry for immediate attention.
